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In assessing the ehanges in East-West relations, the first important 
element isthe rapidity of ehange. Murphy's law no longer applies. Things 
happen mucb more quickly than we ever expected and so far nothing 
has gone wrong. That forces us to rethink most of the concepts which we 
have used over the past decades. In fact, we are moving from a period 
of high military threat but considerable political stability towards a period 
of low threat but high instability. In such a situation it is still unclear 
what force leveIs we will need to deal with these instabilities. As somebody 
put ít recen.tly: «How many divisions has instability?», 
The second new element is the development of the German questiono 
Originally we had thought German unification would come at the end 
of a long process in which East-West relations would improve and ulti-
mateIy borders would have little meaning. New politicaI developments have 
como so quickly and unification is imminent, but the new framework of 
relations has not yet developed. Now the danger is that some peopIe believe 
that with German unification all probIems in Europe will be overcome, 
while in faet we are still at the beginning of a new process of European 
cooperation. 
The third faetor of ehange eoncems developments in the Soviet Union 
itself. At .lhe beginning of his reign, President Gorbachev decided to 
improve relations with the United States, reduce his commitments in the 
Third World and aim at joining the world eeonomy. In some respects 
the underlying reasons for perestroika are the same as those underpinning 
our own move towards Europe 1992. He wants to keep the Soviet Union 
in the race of teehnologically deveIoped countries. We, in aiming at Europe 
1992, aIso want to maintain our eompetitive position vis-à-vis Japan, the 
newly industrialised eountries and .the United States. The difference is, 
of course, that we have been working at it already for some forty years 
while the Soviet Union is just star,ting. In addition, we are now seeing 
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how difficult it is to reform the Soviet Union, because everything has to 
be reformed at once for there to be any chance of success. We are also 
seeing that the process of perestroika is getting bogged down, that some 
new programme will have to be developed and that it is most uncertain 
whether Gorbachev provides sufficient leadership to carry out major reformo 
In any case, he has no model to offer for European cooperation. His idea 
of a common European home has little meaning as long as he has not 
put his own house in order. At the same time, he is in a difficult political 
position. The Communist Party is being discredited and Gorbachev is 
trying to dissociate himself from it. Thus his rule becomes very personal 
without a clear constituency, while at the same time the Communist Party, 
though discredited, still provides the personnel for fulfilling mm:t functions 
in the bureaucracy. 
In international relations, the Soviet position is characterized by the 
10ss of options. The emphasis on perestroika and the development of a 
market economy remove the basic threat Western society has posed to 
the Soviet system. At the same time, polítical developments in Eastern 
Europe and the emergence of democratically-elected governments are dimi-
nishing Soviet influence in Eastern Europe. The Warsaw Treaty Organi-
sation is disintegrating and it is difficult to see how it could be built up 
again as a poltical organisation, for it has never been one. Soviet withdrawal 
from Eastern Europe started in the economic sphere; that will inevitably 
lead to abandonment in the political and security fields as weIl. As these 
developrnents are inevitable, we should not pay any price to obtain them. 
Yet, we do not want to give the Soviet Union the impression that we 
are crowding them out of Euopean affairs. We are in a paradoxical situa-
tion. 011 the one hand, we want to keep them out of Europe, certainly in the 
sense of having them remove their forces from Eastern Europe. But, on 
the other hand, we want to keep them in by giving them the feeling that 
they belong to Europe and have a role to play. The Soviets .themselves 
have not yet adjusted to this situation. They know what they have lost, 
but they have no clear objective as to what they could and would want 
to gain from the new situation. 
The fourth new developrnent is that arms control no longer is the 
agent of change we thought it could be about a year ago. In fact, it is 
becoming increasingly difficult to conclude the negotiations in Vienna 
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on Conventional Forces in Europe in .the framework of two military 
alliances. The concept of parity between the two pacts has become doubtful 
and Moseow is already arguing that after CFE implementation it would 
be weaker than NATO. It is even more difficult to envisage what criteria 
should apply to fo11ow-on negotiations after CFE. We alI want to continue 
the negotiations immediately but the best framework is still uncIear. The 
35-nations CSCE would be an obvious forum, bu.t there toa it will be 
difficult to see what measures of disarmament would apply to a11 of them. 
Nevertheless, a conc1usion of CFE will be an essential basis for further 
progresso Withou.t it a continuation of arms-control negotiations would 
become very difficult and our prospects for new security arrangements 
in Europe would hang in the air. 
The fifth factor is the emergence of nationatism. We in the West are 
to a certain extent at the end of our history; at the end of our history 
of violent eonflict. In the East most of .the old problems and controversies 
have not been digested. They were ]ess visible during the period of com-
munist domination but now they have resurfaced. The most important 
conc1usion of this situation is that the countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe are a11 looking to the European Community for help but have 
very littIe inclination to work together. That has an impact on our Western 
approach to a11 European aetivities, which leads me .to support the «con-
centric circIes» approaeh. We can do much for everybody, but nol neces-
sarily lhe same for all countries. Looking at the European Community 
as ,the first circle and Westem European Union as the nuc1eus of coun-
tries which also want to extend tbeir cooperation to security questions, 
the second layer would be the European Eeonomie Space with the EFT A 
eountries. The third layer would be the Council of Europe whieh could 
be extended fairly easily with the new democracies as soon as they accept 
the responsibilities of its statute and respeet human rights. Such an exten-
sion would give lhe new democracies a sense of belonging and a forum 
for political discussion. The fourth layer would be the CSCE process which 
could aet as an umbre11a over the spectrum of activities while preserving 
existing organisations. The best approaeh would be to work towards a 
situation in which a11 tbese organisations interlock and reinforce eaeh 
other, even if they sometimes partiaI1y overlap. 
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In thIS con.text, Western European Union is a crossroad organisation. 
On the one hand it is the European pillar of NA TO, on the other the 
security dimension of European integration. Opinions about its evolution 
differ, but it could best be regarded as a transitional organisation on the 
road towards European Union, in which ultimately the economic, foreign 
policy and security dimensions wiU converge. For the time being, of course, 
WEU is not a perfect pillar. We do not have alI member countries of 
the European Community in WEU, nor a11 European members of the 
Atlan.tic AIliance. Nevertheless, it is the onIy framework available in which 
a comprehensive discussion of political-military issues can take pIace in 
a European contexto 
Building a European pillar of NATO will require an assessment of 
the future tasks of NATO. The most important constant element wil1 
remain the security function. Even in the best climate of East-West 
relations, the Soviet Union, or even Russia, will be the largest military 
power on our continent. To live confortably with that presence Western 
Europe will need a .transatlantic link, both in the conventional and in 
the nuclear field. NATO and an American presence in Europe will aIlow 
us to live more or less comfortably with that Russian presenee. Under 
new circunstances this seeurity funetion eould best be deseribed as an 
insurance against things going wrong. The second function is to eonsuIt 
on political-military issues throughout the world. This consultation does 
not necessarily mean joint action because, in the Third World, NATO's 
possibility for such joint action will rema in very limited. Here there is 
some seope for European activity, which eould sub~equent1y be coordinated 
with parallel US aetion, but NATO aetion will be regarded as drawing 
a particular Third World conflict into an East-West contexto 
The third funetion would be to formulate arms control policies and 
monitor their resuIts. Par.tieularly after the eonclusion of CFE, verification 
wiU beeome very important. European countries will have to shoulder 
part of that burden, but .lhe outeome of inspections will c1early have to 
be discussed in an Allianee context as well. 
The fourth functions is the inter-Alliance function of moderation when 
particular problems arise, such as the Greco-Turkish controversy. The 
importanee of this funetion will of course depend upon the evolution of 
re1ations among NA TO members and their internai stability. 
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These four functions will remain valid in the future. Yet it is clear 
that NATO will have to change. Some say it should be more política!. 
Others argue that NATO has always been primarily a political organisation. 
Making it more political could only mean making it less military. We shal1 
have to provide a new rationale for maintaining NA TO under changing 
circumstances. That wilI apply to preserving the transatlantic link and 
the presence of North American forces in Europe, and also to the willing-
ness of European countrles, particularly the smaller ones, to maintain 
an adequate defence contribution. NATO has already decided to review 
its strategy. Hopefully, that will also apply to its polítical perspective. The 
Harmel report has served us well for more .than twenty years and the 
maxim of «defence and détente» will continue to be valido Nevertheless, 
the objective of creating a climate in which underlying tensions could be 
resolved has virtually been achieved. 
NA TO's strategic review will have to assess the implications of the 
impending withdrawal of Soviet forces from Eastem Europe for the kind 
of forces the West needs to maintain in the future. It seems clear already 
that the density of NATO ground forces will be lower. To offset this 
at least in part the emphasis will be on mobility, which in tum will impose 
new requirements for command and contraI, communications, surveillance 
and target acquisition. In times of crisis .there will be a need for mobili-
sation and reinforcement to «reconstitute) an effective defensive posture. 
But the warning time will be sufficiently long to allow for this. The role 
of the navy will be enhanced for, apart from its inherent flexibility and 
capabilities for crisis management, overseas reinforcement would no longer 
suffer from doubts ab()ut timely arrival at the battlefront. 
The role of WEU 
The 1987 Platform of European Securi.ty Interests confirmed the 
fundamental need for a continued presence of North Amerlcan forces 
in Europe, for an adequate mix of conventional and nuclear forces and 
for countries to be defended «at their borders». Subsequent work has 
been directed towards practical cooperation (training and verification 
activities) and more conceptual studies. The presence of naval units from 
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Member States in the Gulf to ensure freedom of passage through interna-
tional waters has been the first example of eoordinated European action 
to proteet its interests outside the NATO area. Future work should be 
directed at three problem areas: 
1. The srengthening of the European identity. preferably through the 
formation of European units. These would demonstrate European coopera-
tion to our own public and sustain willingness to maintain reasonable leveIs 
of defence spending. In addition they would show .that military force 
will no longer be national force, which would reassure the countries of 
Eastem Europe and convince the US that Europe remains serious about 
its defence effort. Multinational units shoutd apply not just to Germany 
but also to other countries, since special arrangements for Germany alone 
should be avoided. In my view multinational divisions with national inputs 
at brigade leveI would provide an optimum of political importance and 
military significance. 
2. Provide a new rationale for a continued American and Canadian 
presence in Europe, preferably through a «transatlantic bargaim> in which 
the role and function of one side are defined as complementary to the 
other. 
3. Assess the minimum security requirements of the Soviet Union 
and its future relations with neighbouring countries. Apart from bilateral 
arrangements, these will require some institutionalisatíon of pan-European 
cooperation, providing regular opportunities for political discussion and 
machinery for conciliation when instabilities tend to escalate. In any case. 
the results of inspections under the arms control agreements will need 
to be discussed in a standing commission in arder to clarify ambiguities 
between notifications and the actual situation. It may also be desirable 
to discuss new techllological developments which could upset the llew 
balance. The NATO summit in LOlldon has indieated willingness to insti-
tutionalise important parts of the CSCE processo 
The April 1990 ministerial meeting of WEU gave a mandate to the 
Presidency and the Secretary-General to conduct a fact-finding mission 
to the newly democratic countries of Central and Eastern Europe. These 
visits are intended to ascertain their views on European security in general, 
and their own position as countrÍes bordering on the Soviet Union in 
particular. 
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Conc/usion 
The cohesion and stability of Western Europe's existing security struc-
lures are major assets in the face of the uncertainties surrounding the 
consolidation of democracies in Eastern Europe and the future of Soviet 
Power. If the USSR is to survive, reform of the Soviet system is no 
longer enough; it must be abolished. The urgency of the situation may 
hasten the arrival of new leaders. We must be prepared for every even-
tuality. 
The balance of force will continue to dominate the internationaI dia-
logue even though significant progress has been achieved in the field of 
arms control, where each new stage seems to add to the complexity of 
lhe problems to be solved. 
Greater stability in Europe does not automatically Iead to greater 
stability outsrde Europe. In an increasingly multi-polar world, risks are 
both proliferating and diversifying. Faced with this practical reality, Europe 
must have capabilities to react to crisis situations. At the same time Euro-
peans must act in concert rather than make an unseemly rush for doors 
that have onIy just been opened by the arms contraI negotiations. 
At a time when lhe European Community has decided to press on 
with economic and monetary union, while agreeing on a timetable for 
the definition of political union, WEU can make a decisive contribution 
to the shaping of the future of european security structures based on 
a c1ear-cut European security identity. 
Even with a european Union we wil1 stiU need NATO, a changed 
NATO perhaps, making it more balanced, with two pilIars, but certainly 
based on those crucial factors which have made it 50 successful and al10wed 
us to progress to where we are today. An Alliance based on shared values 
and common interests. WEU wants to strengthen that community by 
demonstraling that although circumstances have changed we ,take our 
security just as seriously. 
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